jwilly

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jwilly last won the day on September 6

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About jwilly

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  1. 23 Matilda IIs in France...some of them CS. Any remaining Matildas in France were Matilda I. All armies' TOEs often are theoretical, particularly during weapon introduction-transitions (i.e. Matilda I --> II) and during and following combat (i.e. Battle of France, during which the actual armament of the entire surviving/escaped BEF went essentially to zero). Whatever "history" means, it doesn't mean theoretical.
  2. My guess is that buying equipment from the future (i.e. sooner than historical research says it could have been fielded) is a non-starter. There would be no historically supported context in which a Tiger could have been built and fielded in 1940. Tigers were built as soon as the design was sorted out, all of the subassemblies were manufacturable, and the fabrication and assembly capability existed. No point in further discussion of that. If equipment availability was to depend on historical information that can be researched and analyzed even though it didn't happen historically due to an overriding event i.e. Dunkirk, that research has to be done and a timeline of soonest-availability assembled. Only a relatively few weapons in our part of WWII could have been built and fielded sooner than they historically were. In the above concept, for most weapons, game availability will be the same as historical availability, because the gating factor was design-development or manufacturability. But, in some instances, historical circumstances delayed or halted development, manufacturing or fielding of a particular weapon. If that history plays out differently in-game, that weapon might be available, sooner or at all. Those instances are the ones that are of interest.
  3. CRS is baby-stepping back into development by adding models that are clones of existing models, but with parameter changes to make them perform like a different version. Why not do that same thing for ammo-tiering? The 88 model in T0 would have PzGr AP. The 88 model in T1 and beyond would have PzGr 39, which historically was first fielded in 1941. Ditto with other weapons that were significantly upgraded after introduction.
  4. Historical timeline could work, if it was history-as-it-would-have-been-without-Dunkirk-and-the-Armistice. The British would have 50:50 six pounder cruisers in T0.5; full six pounder towed AT in T0.5; full six pounder cruisers in T1; and six pounder infantry tanks for T1.5, as soon as the Valentine model is ready. The Germans correspondingly might skip the 50mm L/42 and go directly to the L/60, but not sooner than the various historical arrivals of the L/42. So, in T1, the British would have a considerable advantage. Then the Tiger, where available, would reverse the imbalance for T2. The French would get B1(ter) and S40 in T1, and G1 in T2. As the only army in 1940 with a completed, contract-ready design for 75mm APCR and the raw materials and production capability to manufacture them, maybe the French would get that ordnance for the G1's 75mm in T2. I'd think they'd be able to hold their own in T1, and, assuming that the Germans would get Tigers at limited locations, also in T2. Of course, maybe the intent instead would be continuation of historical-timeline-with-the historical-effects-of-the-British-and-French-being-defeated-in-1940. If so, then yeah, you're right, historical-timeline wouldn't work.
  5. Hatch said earlier in the thread that the forthcoming discussion would include whether to base TOEs solely on historical data, or solely on play balance, or on a hybrid. You seem to be arguing that CRS is foolish to already have decided to base TOEs solely on historical data. I don't think anyone from CRS has said that's the intent.
  6. Sometimes. (1) The British were on track in may 1940...contracts issued, construction plans in place, new machine tools received and sitting in storage awaiting installation...to cease production of the two pounder gun in all but one production line, and the corresponding carriage, and begin production in August of the six pounder. There was a delay in availability of longer-reach drill/lathe machines for bore finishing and rifling, so there was to be a short version of the six pounder for the first six months of production, with a barrel length slightly greater than that of the two pounder since those existing barrel-lathe machines were to be retained and adapted to the greater caliber, and that length was their upper limit. Cruiser tank production was to be converted immediately to the six pounder, along with towed AT gun production. To that end, the two pounder carriage factory also was changing over to the quite different six pounder carriage. Infantry tanks were to be converted over later. In the meantime, the one remaining two pounder production line would support that tank production. The BEF equipment losses during the defeats and retreats culminating at Dunkirk caused all of those plans to be put on hold, because of the desperate need to crank out any ready-to-build gun ASAP to be able to defend against the expected German invasion of Britain. Then equipment losses in North Africa caused a further delay. The historical plan, though, was for the first towed six pounders to reach the BEF in November 1940, and for towed two pounders to be relegated to the Home Guard by mid 1941. (2) The Germans could have begun production of the 50mm L/60 gun sooner, but (a) the German high command thought that the 50mm L/42 in upcoming tanks and the PaK 36 37mm respectively were quite adequate. Presumably they were unaware that the British were about to introduce 57mm gun armed cruiser tanks. (2) the German high command had limited production capacity for high quality gun barrel steel, and chose to allocate a substantial percentage to warship gun production. (3) The British had a quite-effective-for-its-time HEAT RG in 1940, and a so-so frag RG. The French had built 150,000 of their Brandt HEAT RG before May 1940, and that ordnance was sitting in warehouses due to bureaucratic delays in training troops in its use. They had an effective frag RG, plus were about to convert over to RG use of their already-in-the-supply-chain 50mm frag and smoke mortar rounds, via a new rifle firing adapter. The Germans did not have any RG system in 1940. The 30mm system's weak frag and smoke rounds weren't fielded until 1940. The Luftwaffe's own HEAT RG introduced for Crete was pretty much a failure, and the original 30mm system's HEAT RG was too weak to be useful. The Germans didn't have an effective HEAT RG in the field until 1942. (4) OTOH, the Germans had a sticky-attachment "sapper" HEAT device in development in 1940...the HHL-1...and maybe could have fielded some late in that year if there'd been a combat need. Certainly that weapon family was available to be fielded in 1941, though not historically visible due to the infrequency that year of situations where its use was called for. The British, French and later the Americans never had a comparable weapon. (5) There were substantial technical differences between the capabilities of the panzerschreck, bazooka and PIAT. The panzerschreck's ammo was in such short supply that troops were ordered to use it only against tanks that could not be killed some other way. No development work was put into making the rockets lethal against infantry. The bazooka OTOH was "infantry artillery", commonly used as an anti-infantry ordnance projector. A substantial majority of ammo sent to the field was firing against targets other than enemy tanks. The development of a WP round was in specific response to infantry requests for even more anti-infantry lethality for pillbox clearing. The PIAT was always considered a multipurpose infantry "gun", with its heavy HEAT round plus an HE round with as much blast as a 25 pounder shell, and a massive WP round for incendiary, smoke and fortification-clearing uses.
  7. AFAIK, CRS remains as committed as always to not going Pay to Win.
  8. No such thing historically on the German side. The 88 and other heavy AA guns had only timed AA fuzes. Proximity fuzes on the Allied side would be Tier 4 and beyond, and only after modeling of heavy guns for which they were available.
  9. What will be the "historical" end of the British/French/German development spectrum for tiers after 0...actual history, or historical capabilities? What if the actual history was brought about by war-events that haven't yet happened in that WWIIOL campaign?
  10. Only one side practically marketable. Mostly naval air on the US side, with a few exceptions once the Americans essentially have won the battle, and no mechanics exist for carrier ops. Very one sided gameplay totally favoring the Japanese until Guadalcanal and thereafter totally favoring the US. Heavily focused on the naval game, and CRS's naval mechanics and modeling are extremely primitive and limited at the most charitable. Naval game heavily focused on night fighting. CRS has no working mechanics for limited night visibility, and no working mechanics for realistic fighting ranges. Naval and air fighting highly influenced by weather and sea-state. CRS has minimal weather mechanics, unrealistic for the Pacific, and no working mechanics for sea-state. A Guadalcanal land fight would be the only one that historically had a chance of both sides winning, but the who-would-win question was predetermined by operational decisions made by the Japanese before the American landing. There's no more-or-less-historically-realistic setup for that fighting, once those pre-landing decisions are made, that would result in both sides having a chance to win. On Guadalcanal, realistically only one side could have tanks, and the other side had no viable AT weapons. On Guadalcanal, realistically only one side could have an on-land airfield. On Guadalcanal, almost all the terrain was dense jungle or tall grass, and the terrain was very rough and very wet/swampy, with rain almost every afternoon. CRS doesn't have good models and mechanics for any of that. And, nothing already is modeled for the Japanese side except the 25mm AA gun. CRS can't even get a partial set of Italian land models developed, tested and introduced, and they're going to tackle a full land/air/sea set for the Japanese, plus naval vessels for the Americans / allies?
  11. The armor penetration of a thin case instant fuzed bomb of course fundamentally is zero. There might be blast damage, but not after armor penetration. The "tanks" part of this obviously is wholly unrealistic. If the marketing thrust of the rollback is the above, Mo's first post is correct, and the game's evolution toward realism is at an end. My understanding is that the core problem was that bombs no longer could penetrate destroyers. That's not a problem for the modeled bombs...their performance has been more realistic since the Scotsman-originated changes. The DD problem rather is that the DD has a bad damage model. I'd be more optimistic if CRS would tell us that bombs will revert to realistic performance as soon as the DD damage model is fixed so that the current bombs do only superstructure damage. If CRS wants players to have the option of dropping heavy case, delay fuzed bombs, they should add plane-model-copies to the spawnlists with that armament instead of GP bombs.
  12. Certainly it was bad for some models (DDs, etc.) to have become unkillable. But, will GP (i.e. thin case, instant fuze) bombs provide armor-penetration tank kills once the bomb performance data is re-implemented?
  13. It sounds good to me, too.
  14. +1 As close as I can tell, CRS doesn't count posts for X or against Y in the forums, and decide what to do based on those counts. Not at all. They do read forum posts, to catch those instances when one of us comes up with a novel idea that might work. But, post counts for and against someone's posted idea mean nothing. CRS decides how to evolve the game design based on a planning process that takes into account inputs that we players don't have access to...costs of development, financial timelines, resource scheduling and so forth. The community data that is of most importance is CRS survey results. We don't have access to that data, either. CRS has said in the past that it's pretty much normal for forum participants to be 100% confident in saying what a majority of the current-and-potential community obviously wants, that would cause them to subscribe or re-subscribe; but nonetheless to be off base from what survey data indicates the community actually wants. CRS's strategic vision of what the game is and will be, relative to its competitors, has a much longer timeline than most forum posters. Proposals to dramatically change the development direction are less likely to be adopted simply because where the game is at any given time is partway toward implementation of plans and resource commitments that were put in place, in most cases, a year or more ago.
  15. What's missing is some sort of requirement that spawning can only occur at locations that have a supply line. Unfortunately the strat mesh code wasn't written with a supply line concept. So, the strat mesh doesn't know if bridges are up or down, etc., etc.